Pure Type Systems, PTSs, were introduced as a generalization of the type systems of Barendregt's lambda cube and were designed to provide a foundation for actual proof assistants which will verify proofs. Systems of illative combinatory logic or lambda calculus, ICLs, were introduced by Curry and Church as a foundation for logic and mathematics. In an earlier paper we considered two changes to the rules of the PTSs which made these rules more like ICL rules. This led to four kinds (...) of PTSs. Most importantly PTSs are about statements of the form M:A, where M is a term and A a type. In ICLs there are no explicit types and the statements are terms. In this paper we show that for each of the four forms of PTS there is an equivalent form of ICL, sometimes if certain conditions hold. (shrink)

This is a commentary on an article from "dialogue", march 1972: "first philosophy: metaphysics or epistemology?" by kenneth dorter. epistemologies from the time of descartes which have largely replaced ontology emphasize the human conditions for knowing, and where an ontology is lacking supply a knowledge by description with no objective world to describe. the humanism which refuses to go beyond mankind to learn about man elects to follow a path to extinction, and insofar as we hold to an egocentric viewpoint (...) in "first philosophy", a truly objective science of ontology has taken flight. (shrink)

W. J. Mander provides a brief introduction to and critical assessment of the thought of the greatest of the British Idealist philosophers, F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), whose work has been largely neglected in this century. After a general introduction to Bradley's metaphysics and its logical foundations, Mander shows that much of Bradley's philosophy has been seriously misunderstood. Mander argues that any adequate treatment of Bradley's thought must take full account of his unique dual inheritance from the traditions of British empiricism (...) and Hegelian rationalism. The scholarship of recent years is assessed, and new interpretations are offered of Bradley's views about truth, predication, and relations, and of his arguments for idealism. (shrink)

This paper argues that a strong thesis of divine providence, whereby God is understood as in complete control of all things, entails pantheism, the thesis that the universe is not ontologically distinct from God. In normal discourse, we distinguish a plan from, on the one hand, the state of affairs which realizes that plan—its execution or expression—and, on the other hand, the person or group whose plan it is. However, with respect to an omnipotent God who displays complete providence, neither (...) of these two distinctions holds. We cannot separate person from plan, or plan from world, and in consequence, neither can we separate person from world, ergo pantheism. Accordingly, the argument of this paper comes in two parts maintaining, first, the impossibility of distinguishing between God’s plan and its execution and, second, the impossibility of distinguishing God himself from his plan. (shrink)

Let S denote the variety of Sugihara algebras. We prove that the lattice (K) of subquasivarieties of a given quasivariety K S is finite if and only if K is generated by a finite set of finite algebras. This settles a conjecture by Tokarz [6]. We also show that the lattice (S) is not modular.

F. H. Bradley did not write extensively or systematically on the philosophy of religion, and much of what he did write has the character of either tentative speculation or the pre-emptive rebuttal of potential misinterpretations that might threaten his general philosophical position. ‘I admit that on this subject I never had much to say’ he warns. But such a remark should not discourage us from considering his views on this topic, since the disclaimer is typically Bradleian, and more reflective of (...) his high standards for what is required in order to claim to have something to say about some matter than of any genuine lack of opinion. On closer inspection we find that he has, scattered throughout his work, a great many important things to say about this subject. (shrink)

Life, work, and influences -- Life -- Work -- Influences -- Metaphysics -- The intelligible world -- The existence of the intelligible world -- The intelligible and the divine world -- The intelligible and the natural world -- Knowledge -- Mind and body -- The souls of animals -- Knowledge : thought and souls -- Knowledge : God -- Mediate knowledge : external world -- Discussion and assessment of Norris's theory -- Was Norris an idealist? -- Faith and reason -- (...) The Socinian controversy -- Faith -- Reason -- Above reason and contrary to reason -- The measure of truth -- Faith and reason -- Malebranche -- Descartes -- Locke -- Love -- The theory of love -- The regulation of love -- The measure of divine love -- Controversy with Locke -- Norris's criticisms of Locke -- Locke's responses -- Concluding comments. (shrink)

The paper argues that Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell’s Theory of Descriptions where Russell’s theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan’s distinction for Russell’s theory, (...) provided of course that Russell’s theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions. (shrink)

We study modal logics in the setting of varieties of modal algebras. Any variety of modal algebras generated by a finite algebra — such, a variety is called tabular — has only finitely many subvarieties, i.e. is of finite height. The converse does not hold in general. It is shown that the converse does hold in the lattice of varieties of K4-algebras. Hence the lower part of this lattice consists of tabular varieties only. We proceed to show that there is (...) a continuum of pretabular varieties of K4-algebras — those are the non-tabular varieties all of whose proper subvarieties are tabular — in contrast with Maksimova's result that there are only five pretabular varieties of S4-algebras. (shrink)

What precisely, W. J. T. Mitchell asks, are pictures (and theories of pictures) doing now, in the late twentieth century, when the power of the visual is said to be greater than ever before, and the "pictorial turn" supplants the "linguistic turn" in the study of culture? This book by one of America's leading theorists of visual representation offers a rich account of the interplay between the visible and the readable across culture, from literature to visual art to the mass (...) media. (shrink)

What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point- and need-based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in On Certainty, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism-driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the reason-based (...) contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept-users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof. (shrink)

A well-known result, going back to the twenties, states that, under some reasonable assumptions, any logic can be characterized as the set of formulas satisfied by a matrix 〈,F〉, whereis an algebra of the appropriate type, andFa subset of the domain of, called the set of designated elements. In particular, every quasi-classical modal logic—a set of modal formulas, containing the smallest classical modal logicE, which is closed under the inference rules of substitution and modus ponens—is characterized by such a matrix, (...) wherenow is a modal algebra, andFis a filter of. If the modal logic is in fact normal, then we can do away with the filter; we can study normal modal logics in the setting of varieties of modal algebras. This point of view was adopted already quite explicitly in McKinsey and Tarski [8]. The observation that the lattice of normal modal logics is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subvarieties of a variety of modal algebras paved the road for an algebraic study of normal modal logics. The algebraic approach made available some general results from Universal Algebra, notably those obtained by Jónsson [6], and thereby was able to contribute new insights in the realm of normal modal logics [2], [3], [4], [10].The requirement that a modal logic be normal is rather a severe one, however, and many of the systems which have been considered in the literature do not meet it. For instance, of the five celebrated modal systems, S1–S5, introduced by Lewis, S4 and S5 are the only normal ones, while only SI fails to be quasi-classical. The purpose of this paper is to generalize the algebraic approach so as to be applicable not just to normal modal logics, but to quasi-classical modal logics in general. (shrink)

W. J. Mander presents the first ever synoptic history of British Idealism, the school of thought which dominated English-language philosophy from the 1860s to the early 20th century. He restores to its proper place this neglected period of philosophy, introducing the exponents of Idealism and explaining its distinctive concepts and doctrines.

Art history on the edge : iconology, media, and visual culture -- Four fundamental concepts of image science -- Image science -- Image X text -- Realism and the digital image -- Migrating images : totemism, fetishism, idolatry -- The future of the image : Rancière's road not taken -- World pictures : globalization and visual culture -- Media aesthetics -- There are no visual media -- Back to the drawing board : architecture, sculpture, and the digital image -- Foundational (...) sites and occupied spaces -- Border wars : translation and convergence in politics and media -- Art X environment -- The historical uncanny : phantoms, doubles, and repetition in the war on terror -- The spectacle today : a response to retort -- Coda : for a sweet science of images. (shrink)

Royce's Argument for the Absolute w.j. MANDER IN 188 5 IN THE PENULTIMATE CHAPTER of his first book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Josiah Royce put forward an argument for Absolute Idealism based on the possibility of error. He considered the argument a most important one and returned to it on numerous occasions after that, slightly recasting it each time,' but never, he later claimed, really leaving it behind. Nor was he alone in his opinion of it; well received by (...) his contemporaries, such as William James, the argument did much to establish the young Royce's reputation. 9 Like the Absolute Idealism which it was designed to support, Royce's once- famous argument is now largely forgotten, yet there is no real justification for this save fashion, for it deals in a fresh and imaginative way with a subject matter still very much discussed in the literature. The purpose of this study is to recon- sider Royce's argument and to assess its validity. I shall examine it in some detail below, but first let me give a very brief summary of Royce's case keeping as close as possible to his own original presentation of it. The argument occurs in the following places, references to which will be abbreviated by the letters in brackets: The Religious Aspect of Philosophy , Chap. XI; The spirit of Modern Philosophy , Ch. XI; "The Implications of self-Consciousness," reprinted in his Studies.. (shrink)

Op basis van de zgn. wijsbegeerte der wetsidee van Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) bouwt de auteur een christelijke, wijsgerige antropologie.